Research: Markets


Bounded Rationality in Markets for Lemons

Roland Kirstein
Annette Kirstein, Univ. Karlsruhe

Market failure due to asymmetric information leads to a lower degree of inefficiency if the uninformed buyers are boundedly rational. The experiment demonstrates that "iterative reasoning" explains such boundedly rational behavior, both in one-shot games and in repeated games.

Kirstein, R./Kirstein, A. (2007): Less Rationality, More Efficiency. A Laboratory Experiment on "Lemons Markets".

Kirstein, R./Kirstein, A. (2007): Europäischer Verbraucherschutz - Ausdruckgrenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment zu "Lemons"-Märkten; forthcoming in: Ohr, R. (ed.): Verein für Socialpolitik, Wirtschaftspolitischer Ausschuß, Göttingen, März 2006, Duncker & Humblodt, Berlin.

Two-Stage Collective Wage Bargaining

Annette Kirstein, Univ. Karlsruhe
Roland Kirstein

The experiment examines the impact of different legal settings on collective wage beargaining with re-negotiation. We assume that, after the initial contract has been closed, a demand shock may occur. Legal regulation may allow for re-negotiation only if demand goes up, only if it goes down, in both cases, or it may prohibit re-negotiation altogether.

Re-imports of Pharmaceuticals

Roland Kirstein
Philipp v. Dietze, Attorney, Hamburg

The study examines a lawsuit against GlaxoSmithKlyne brought by Greece to the European Court of Justice. Apparently, the court is willing to apply a "more economic approach".

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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