Research: Organization


Anti-Sharing

Roland Kirstein
Robert Cooter, UC Berkeley

Holmstrom (1982) has demonstrated that teams work inefficiently if they share the team output in a budged-balanced manner. Anti-Sharing may solve this problem. However, if a team member assumes the role of the Anti-Sharer, she has no incentive to contribute effort. Thus, the first-best outcome cannot be reached by internal Anti-Sharing. In a first paper, the conditions were derived under which internal Anti-Sharing leads to a higher team profit than budget-balanced Sharing. A possible application is a new theory of firms and partnerships, and the problem of contributions to public goods.

Kirstein, R./Cooter, R. (2007): Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams; forthcoming in Economics Letters.

Kirstein, R./Cooter, R. (2006): Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms.

Kirstein, R.: Anti-Teilen in Teams. In: Spengler, Th./Kossbiel, H. (eds.), Modellgestützte Personalentscheidungen 8, München/Mering, 51-62.

Optimal Organizational Structure with Rent-Seeking

Dominique Demougin, Humboldt Univ.
Roland Kirstein

We examine the optimal structure of an organization if its members may engage in productive as well as in rent-seeking activities. An application would be the partition of a university in departments.

Cartel-Stabilization through Collective Wage Agreements

Roland Kirstein
Annette Kirstein, Univ. Karlsruhe

The instability of a product market cartel can be removed by a collective wage agreement on the factor market, if this agreement prescribes linear contracts and minimum fixed and variable wages. The study is relevant for Strategic Management and for cartel authorities. Moreover, it may contribute another solution to the "fixed wage puzzle". The next step would be an empirical test of the theoretical insights, using field data.

Kirsten, R./Kirstein, A. (2007): Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies

Bayesian Monitoring

Roland Kirstein

The inspection game rests on the assumption that monitoring is costly and perfect. A unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies can be derived, and the probability of unlawful behavior is inde-pendet of the fine. Here, these assumptions are reveresed. With costless, but imperfect monitoring, the game has three Nash equilibria (one in pure strategies, two in mixed strategies), none of them inlcudes perfect compliance. These three equilibria have different properties with regard to the impact of fines on the probability of unlawful behavior. In an intra-firm context, they can be interpreted as different management styles.

Incentives for Employee Inventions

Roland Kirstein
Birgit Will, Saarland Univ.

A legislative proposal of the German federal government regarding the compensation for employees' inventions is examined. The aim of the legislator is to let employees participate in the success of their inventions, and to increase the number of patents in Germany. We show that a counter-intentional effect is possible: the incentives of the employees may be distorted, hence the number of inventions may decline.

Kirstein, R. / Will, B. (2006): Efficient Compensation for Employees' Inventions. In: European Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1), 129-148.

Will, B./Kirstein, R. (2004); Effiziente Vergütung von Arbeitnehmererfindungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse einer deutschen Gesetzesreform. In: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, Ergänzungsheft 4/2004, 25-49.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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