Literature on Law and Economics

 Two helpful textbooks on this topic are

  • Cooter, R./Ulen, T. (2003): Law and Economics, 4th ed., Reading/MA.
  • Polinsky, A.M. (2003): An Introduction to Law and Economics; 3rd ed., Aspen Publishers. You may wish to read Picker (2000) as an appetizer.

Articles on Law and Economics

  • Bebchuk, L.A. (1984): Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information; in: RAND Journal of Economics 15(3), 404-415.
  • Becker, G. (1968): Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169-217.
  • Ben Shahar, O./Harel, A. (1995): Blaiming the Victim. Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions against Crime; in: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11(2), 434-465.
  • Brown, J.P. (1973): Toward an Economic Theory of Liability; in: The Journal of Legal Studies 2(2), 323-349.
  • Bush, W.C./Mayer, L.S. (1974): Some Implications of Anarchy for the Distribution of Property; in: Journal of Economic Theory 8(4), 401-412.
  • Calabresi, G. (1970): The Costs of Accidents; Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
  • Calabresi, G./Melamed, A. D. (1972): Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability. One View of the Cathedral, in: Harvard Law Review, 85, 1089-1128.
  • Coase, R.H. (1960): The Problem of Social Cost, in: The Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44.
  • Cole, D.H./Grossmann, P.Z. (2005): Principles of Law and Economics; Pearson Prentice Hall; New Jersey.
  • Cooter, R.D./Porat, A. (2002): Anti-Insurance; in: The Journal of Legal Sudies 31(2), 203-232.
  • Cooter, R.D./Rubinfeld, D.L. (1989): Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and their Resolution; in: Journal of Economic Literature, 27, 1067-1097.
  • Demsetz, H. (1967): Toward a Theory of Property Rights; in: American Economic Review 57(2), Papers and Proceedings, 347-359.
  • Feess, E./Mühlheußer, G. (2002): Economic Consequences of Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football; in: European Journal of Law and Economics 13, 221-237.
  • Frech, H.E., III: State-Dependent Utility and the Tort System as Insurance: Strict Liability versus Negligence; in: International Review of Law and Economics 14 (3), 261-271.
  • Friedman, D. (1999): Why not Hang Them All? The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment; in: Journal of Political Economy 107(6, part 2), S259-S269.
  • Gould, J.P. (1973): The Economics of Legal Conflicts; in: The Journal of Legal Studies 2(2), 279-300.
  • Haucap, J./Kirstein, R. (2003); Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods; in: Public Choice 115, 163-183.
  • Hirshleifer, J. (1995): Anarchy and its Breakdown; in: The Journal of Political Economy 103(1), 26-52.
  • Kirstein, R. (2000a); Risk-Neutrality and Strategic Insurance; in: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance. Issues and Practice 25 (2), 262-272.
  • Kirstein, R. (2000b); Law and Economics in Germany; in: Bouckaert, B./de Geest, G. (eds.): Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol. 1, entry No. 0330; E. Elgar, Cheltenham, 160-227.
  • Kirstein, R. (2012): Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement. Accepted for publication in the Journal of Sports Economics.
  • Kirstein, R. /Cooter, R. (2007): Sharing and anti-sharing in teams, in: Economics Letters Volume 96, Issue 3, September 2007, Pages 351-356.
  • Kirstein, R./Rickman, N.(2004): "Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation; in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160(4), 555-575.
  • Kirstein, R./Schmidtchen, D. (1997); Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance; in: International Review of Law and Economics 17 (4), 509-520.
  • Kirstein, R./Schmidtchen, D. (2003): Self-interest, Social Wealth, and Competition as a Discovery Procedure. Center for the Study of Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 2003-08, Saarbrücken.
  • Kirstein, R./Schmidtchen, D. (2001); Do Artists Benefit from Resale Royalties? An Economic Analysis of a New EU Directive; in: Deffains, B./Kirat, T. (eds.): Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries; The Economics of Legal Relationships Vol. 6, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam et. al., 231-248.
  • Kirstein, R./Will, B. (2006): Efficient Compensation for Employees' Inventions; in: European Journal of Law and Economics 21(2), 129-148.
  • Landes, W. M. (1971): An Economic Analysis of the Courts, in: The Journal of Law and Economics, 14(1), 61-107.
  • Muthoo, A. (2004): A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights; in: Games and Economic Behavior 49, 288-312.
  • Nalebuff, B. (1987): Credible Pre-Trial Negotiation; in: RAND Journal of Economics 18(2), 198-210.
  • Nash, J.F. (1950): The Bargaining Problem; in: Econometrica 18(2), 155-162.
  • P'Ng, I.P.L. (1983): Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial; in: Bell Journal of Economics 14(2), 539-550.
  • Picker, R.C. (2000): An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law; in: Posner, E.A. (ed.), Chicago Lectures in Law and Economics; Foundation Press, New York/NY 2000, 29-47 (the downloadable text is identical to the published one, except for the page breaks). 
  • Polinsky, A. M./Rubinfeld, D.L. (2003): Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients, ALER 5, 165-88.
  • Posner, R.A. (1971): Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest; in: The Journal of Law and Economics 14(1), 201-232.
  • Posner, R.A. (1973): An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, in: The Journal of Legal Studies, 3, 399-458.
  • Reinganum, J.F./Wilde, L.L. (1986): Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs; in: RAND Journal of Economics 17(4), 557-566.
  • Schweizer, U. (1989): Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information; in: The Review of Economic Studies 56(2), 163-177.
  • Scott, A. (1983): Property Rights and Property Wrongs; in: The Canadian Journal of Economics 16(4), 555-573.
  • Shavell, S. (1980): Damage Measures for Breach of Contract; in: Bell Journal of Economics 11(2), 466-490.
  • Spier, K. (1992): The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation; in: Review of Economic Studies 51(1), 93-108.

Maybe you are looking for a book that provides an easy introduction into the game theoretical tools without bothering you too much with the mathematics. Then check out

Dixit, A./Nalebuff, B: Thinking Strategically. WW Norton, New York 1994.
(a "must read" - teaches game theory in a purely verbal style, replaces formulas by simple principle. Perfect for the nightstand.)

Two other highly recommendable books which provide a comprehensible introduction into game theory are:

Carmichael, Fiona: A Guide to Game Theory; Prentice Hall, Harlow et. al. 2005.
(Exhaustive, but simple introduction, mainly focusing on 2x2 games - but this is certainly enough to get the idea.)

Eichberger, J.: Game Theory for Economists; Harcourt Brace, San Diego 1993.
(The perfect solution if both formal precision and comprehensability are relevant - a lot more reader-friendly than Fudenberg/Tirole)

Well and here's another highly recommendable book which offers a lot of inspiring thoughts which play a role in this seminar as well, in particular chapters 1 - on incentives - and 4 - on crime:
Levitt, Steven D./Dubner, Stephen J. (2005): Freakonomics; Harper Collins, NY; the paperback edition was published 2006
Have great fun with it (it took me just two days to read it).

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